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ABSTRACT
The increasing complexity onboard a ship underline the importance of crews that are able to coordinate 
and cooperate with each other to facilitate task objectives through a shared understanding of resources 
(e.g. team members’ knowledge, skills and experience), the crew’s goals, and the constrains under which 
they work. Rotation of personnel through 24/7 shift-work schedules and replacements often put crews in 
a position of having little or no previous history as a team. Findings from 3 studies indicated that unfamiliar 
teams used less efficient coordination strategies which reduced efficiency and increased levels of stress in 
situations where team members where experts on task, distributed or unknown to task and environment. 
Implications for staffing, safety and training are discussed.
(Int Marit Health 2013; 64, 2: 89–94)
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THE SHIPMATE MODEL
Teams are at the centre of how work gets done onboard 
a ship and are defined as 2 or more people carrying out 
highly interdependent tasks based on expertise distributed 
among team members with clearly assigned roles and re-
sponsibilities (e.g. bridge team; navigator, rudder and look 
out). Such teams work in a dynamic environment (e.g. in shore 
waters), share values and common goals (e.g. safe journey) and 
exist for a limited lifespan (e.g. a work shift [1]). Several investi-
gations of disastrous maritime, aviation, military, medical 
and industrial accidents have found teamwork breakdow-
ns (e.g. coordination, communication [2]). Hackman [3] 
concluded, however, that designing teams solely on the 
basis of members’ expertise is no guarantee of success. 
In many cases, information management systems have 
been introduced to enhance team communication and 
information exchange. Stagl et al. [1] pointed out, however, 
that merely connecting experts with collaborate technology 
was not sufficient to guarantee effective performance (e.g., 
distributed teams; bridge and engine).  
The working conditions onboard a ship represent 
a complex and dynamic environment; hence crews often 
face rapidly evolving and ambiguous situations where 
1 correct solution is not always evident or possible. In addition, 
modern technologies increase the pressure through infor-
mation overload and limiting time available to act. Salas 
et al. [4] stated that modern operational environments are 
characterised by a historically unparalleled accelerating 
rate of change that requires team flexibility, adaptability, 
and resilience. To cope, team members must integrate, syn-
thesize, and share information, and they need to coordinate 
and cooperate to accomplish their mission as task demands 
change. Thus effective teams onboard must be able to do 
more than interact with tools, engines and systems etc. The 
increasing complexity onboard a ship underline the impor-
tance of crews that are able to coordinate and cooperate 
with each other to facilitate task objectives through a shared 
understanding of resources (e.g. members’ knowledge, skills 
and experience), the crew’s goals, and the constrains under 
which they work. In essence, crews onboard a ship face 
a dynamic, shifting and complex environment which rises 
a commensurate of task demands that members have to 
resolve through a coordinated process that combines their co-
gnitive, motivational/affective and behavioural resources [5].
Hence, the rotation of personnel through 24/7 shift-work 
schedules and replacements make it difficult to maintain 
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stable person/role expectations over time. Thus many crews 
consist of team members with little or no previous history 
as a team. This may influence both coordination and coope-
ration in teams and thereby efficiency. It is also reasonable 
to deduce that if unfamiliarity represent to much ambiguity 
and uncertainty then such constrains for team members 
may result in higher levels of stress related health issues. 
The international society meet the challenge of unfamiliarity 
with strict regulations where education, documentation, 
auditing, and certificates play an important role. But, it is 
questionable to claim that challenges with unfamiliarity are 
solved by international regulations alone. Do we still have 
a problem with unfamiliarity onboard?
Small group research has a long tradition of studying 
cognitive constructs such as group norms and role expec-
tations that guide interpersonal interaction among team 
members [5]. Interpersonal interaction is important to 
team performance, for instance by influencing how willing 
we are to share information with other team members. In 
a knowledge-driven context, constructs that capture task-re-
levant interaction are of equal interest when performance 
and effectiveness are the subjects under investigation. 
Thus, familiarity is more than interpersonal relations and 
likes or dislikes. It is also about understanding other team 
members’ behaviour while performing tasks. If you do not 
understand the behaviour (what or why) of a team member, 
then coordination (e.g. back-up behaviour) is difficult and 
your willingness to provide information is of less importan-
ce. Thus, it is surprising to discover that research on team 
cognition and task-related issues rarely is related to fami-
liarity in Safety Critical Organisations (SCO). Mohammed et 
al. [6] stated in an overview of the field of team cognition 
that the role of “time together as a team” had been largely 
downplayed in past research on team cognition. 
This is disturbing because the importance of team 
members having a shared understanding is underlined in 
dynamic situations that require high levels of flexibility and 
adaptability in the team [7, 8]. This indicates an important 
asset in teamwork, the transferability to novel situations, 
and a vital ability in SCO’s, where procedures and routine are 
dominant, but where anomalies have the potential to result 
in severe consequences if not handled correctly. In their 
concept of Shared Mental Models (SMM), Cannon-Bowers 
et al. [7] suggest that more effective teams share similar 
mental models and understandings of the situation at hand.
SHARED MENTAL MODELS
Salas et al. [9] contend that SMM are a core aspect of 
the successful coordination of information and behaviour in 
expert teams. The construct of SMM is drawn from theories 
of individual mental models used to explicate individual co-
gnitive functioning or understanding. At the individual level, 
mental models refer to a structure of known elements (e.g. 
declarative knowledge) and the relationship between those 
elements [10]. These structures serve as mechanisms that 
people use in order to describe the purpose and form of 
a system, as well as its functioning in its present and future 
state [11]. Cannon-Bowers and Salas [12] proposed exten-
ding the concept of individual mental models to the team 
performance domain, hypothesising that team performance 
is a function of the extent to which members held similarly 
organised expectations in relation to the task or each other. 
SMM are defined as a shared organised understanding 
and mental representation of key elements of the team’s 
relevant environment. These SMM enable team members 
to form accurate explanations and expectations of the task. 
This will in turn enable team members to coordinate their 
actions and adapt their behaviour to the demands of the 
task and to other team members [7]. 
SMM are assumed to enable team members to predict 
task needs and the actions of other team members, and 
thus enable them to adapt their own behaviour accordingly 
without communicating explicitly. A number of studies have 
indicated that SMM contribute to increased team effecti-
veness [13–18].
SMM are based on the assumption that highly effective 
operational teams are able to understand the system at se-
veral levels. To make this possible, multiple shared models 
must be in action at the same time [7]. Rouse and Morris 
[11] proposed a taxonomy of mental models in which every 
level or type of model differed in importance depending on 
which task was to be solved. Some problems are solved 
through one type of mental model, while other problems 
are solved by integrating several mental models. 
Cannon-Bowers et al. [7] proposed four types of SMM: 
 — Technology/equipment. To extract information, team 
members need to share an understanding and know-
ledge of how to control the technology and equipment 
with which they are interacting. This includes operating 
procedures, limitations and likely failures. 
 — Task at hand. It is also important that team members 
understand the task at hand and how to carry it out. 
This is shared knowledge about what information is 
important and how different types of information must 
be combined to give meaning. It is also important for 
the team members to understand the dynamics of the 
environment and how this impacts on their tasks (i.e. 
time constraints or uncertainty). This includes task pro-
cedures, task strategies, environmental constraints, 
likely contingencies, and scenarios. 
 — Team interaction. Each team member has to under-
stand his/her own role in the overall task, what they as 
an individual team member contribute and how this is 
accomplished. This requires a common understanding 
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of who needs what and when in the team. This will ena-
ble the team members to understand when they must 
monitor other team members to support them with the 
proper behaviour or information, if required. This inc-
ludes their roles/responsibilities, information sources, 
interaction patterns, communication channels, as well 
as role interdependencies.   
 — Team members. Team members must be familiar with 
the knowledge, skills, abilities, preferences, and other 
task-relevant attributes of their team-mates. It is pro-
posed that their expectations of the behaviour of their 
team-mates will vary as a function of who makes up the 
team. And a SMM of team members enables team mem-
bers to adjust their own behaviour to the other team 
members (e.g. 1 team member is on the verge of beco-
ming overwhelmed by a high workload and other team 
members give support by taking on some of workload).
Espevik et al. [19–21] was particular interested in the 
last, SMM of team members and investigated whether fa-
miliarity influences coordination, resilience, and efficiency 
in high performance teams in safety-critical organisations. 
First 24 active duty officers who made up four submarine 
attack teams (i.e. 6 team members each) where situated in 
two similar situations where they subsequently operated as 
intact teams and with one new, unfamiliar team member. 
The aim [19] was to investigate whether knowledge about 
individual team members would augment the effect of 
operational skills in predicting operational effectiveness in 
trained expert teams.
Secondly, based on a notion that some teams are physi-
cally separated (distributed) and have fewer opportunities to 
coordinate due to the absence of paralinguistic, non-verbal 
and other sensory cues, Espevik et al. [20] investigated if 
familiarity within teams could be hampered by physical 
separation between team members. Espevik et al. [20] 
situated familiar and less familiar cadets from the Royal 
Norwegian Naval Academy in simulator tasks [20]. Thus, 
the consequences for communication, physiological aro-
usal, and efficiency in teams that are forced to coordinate 
their activities towards a shared goal in a distributed team 
setting were studied. 
Thirdly, also with cadets from the Royal Norwegian Naval 
Academy in simulator tasks, Espevik et al. [21] followed the 
notion that expert teams also encounter novel situations, 
and the last question addressed was whether familiarity 
with other team member prepared teams for the unexpected 
(novel situations) or, to put it another way, whether they will 
learn more quickly.
The findings from these three studies [19–21] indicated 
that unfamiliar teams used less efficient coordination strate-
gies. The coordination strategies used by unfamiliar expert 
teams was characterised by more overt and controlling 
communication (statements and orders per minute) during 
high workload [19], a lower global anticipation rate (i.e. less 
push of information [20]), and less adaptability(i.e. updates 
and priorities) and back-up statements (i.e. proving help, 
reducing workload for other team members) during novel 
situations [21]. In addition, unfamiliar teams showed less 
overt communication (e.g. confirmation) when confronted 
with a novel situation [20, 21]. Unfamiliar teams performed 
more poorly, being less accurate, quicker and achieving 
less mission success (i.e. more hits [19–21]). Unfamiliar 
teams were less physiologically aroused (heart rate) during 
low workload, and less during high workload, recovery, and 
decreasingly so during training [19–21].
Based on these 3 studies we propose a model, the 
shipmate model (Fig. 1) to explain the advantages of having 
SMM of team members. 
THE SHIPMATE MODEL
Thus one way of understanding the findings is to look at 
what can happen when a team member becomes aware of 
a change in the environment (outer world). The other team 
members sense a change in his/her behaviour — “some-
thing has happened” — (e.g. the team member appears to 
be more concentrated, uncertain). This is in line with the 
proposed property of SMM that they enable the team to 
identify changes in the team and in team-mates [9]. This 
suggests that a SMM of team members enhances a team’s 
sensitivity to change, enabling it to act accordingly (Fig. 1).
SENSITIvITy
The ability to detect deviancies, shortcomings, and un-
certainty in members of the team was enhanced in familiar 
teams, and they focused on rectifying the situation. As 
a result, familiar teams put more effort into understanding 
and coping, even in situations where there was no imme-
diate need for action (e.g. low workload). This, in turn, could 
result in an immediate increase in the observed heart rate 
during low workload [20] and a novel situation [21]. This 
could also help to explain why familiar teams performed 
better than unfamiliar during low workload [20]. Another 
argument in this connection is provided by the finding made 
when looking at heart rate during recovery, where only fami-
liar teams decreased their heart rates [20, 21], indicating 
higher sensitivity and thereby adaptability of the organism 
to environmental demands [22].
Increased sensibility in familiar teams has at least 
2 implications. First, the whole team implicitly shares within 
the team that a change has occurred, and they therefo-
re become aware of changes more quickly and can cope 
with the reality of the change in the environment. Less 
irrelevant communication by the familiar teams [20] can 
be understood as better awareness and, consequently, 
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a more appropriate strategy and an indication of a SMM of 
team members.
Second, familiar teams are able to adjust implicitly to 
the coordinating strategy that best fits the situation and the 
team. The second implication is in line with the theoretical 
framework for SMM, where Cannon-Bowers et al. [7] define 
the ability to implicitly anticipate what your team-mates need 
and, accordingly, what (i.e., information, action) they need 
from you. Thus, a SMM of team members enables the team 
to choose the coordination strategy that is best suited to 
coping with the situation and/or to the abilities of the team. 
These 3 studies indicate that the (implicit) choice of coor-
dination strategy depends on 3 factors/questions: do we 
know the task, are we separated from other team members, 
and are we facing a novel situation (a learning situation)? 
TASK KNOwLEDgE COORDINATION
If the team knows the task (are subject matter experts 
[19]) the coordination seems to be straightforward and 
in accordance with the original theoretical framework for 
SMM. The teams have a general SMM (of equipment, task, 
interaction, and team members) and are able to immediately 
start communicating implicitly. The appropriate coordination 
is “less is more”, i.e., less communication (statements per 
minute) and less control (requests).
When facing a task they are not experts in [20], teams 
are forced to communicate more in order to learn the new 
elements in the task they as a team must adapt to. In such 
cases, familiar teams implicitly know that team-mates need 
more information and thus start to push it or display what 
Entin and Serfaty [23] call a higher global anticipation ratio 
to meet high workload. Thus, a SMM of team members 
enables them to choose a coordination strategy that can 
be characterised as “more is less”, i.e. more transfer, ta-
sk-oriented communication and monitoring (non-verbal).  
DISTRIBuTED COORDINATION
When teams are separated physically, this puts even 
more strain on the coordination process. The solution to 
the obstacle to communication seems to be implicitly un-
derstood by familiar teams. Given physical separation [20], 
the strategy for familiar teams seems to be “more is less”. 
A SMM of team members enables familiar teams to push 
information, increase the number of transfers when sepa-
rated and, contrary to within teams, enhance the overall 
communication strategy by communicating more when the 
workload increases [20]. 
COORDINATION IN NOvEL SITuATIONS
When teams that have a SMM of team members face 
a novel situation [21], they implicitly understand there is 
a need to learn, and they act accordingly (“we do not know 
and have to learn — together”). In such situations, teams 
that have a SMM of team members have 2 parallel commu-
nication strategies. Initially, when the uncertainty is greatest, 
it is crucial to create a common understanding of the surro-
undings. Hence, they adjust (implicitly) and become more 

















Experts: “Less is more”
Novices: “More is less“
Figure 1. The shipmate model: The symbols S1/S2/S3 are understood as findings from Espevik et al. [19–21]. The logic is explained 
to be that when a change takes place in the outer world this is sensed (discovered) by one or 2 members in the team. Then the teams 
choose 3 different ways to coordinate based on what knowledge and skill they have on own task, if they are separated, or face a novel 
situation. This then give better outcomes (e.g. more hits)
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loop communication to develop a SMM of the equipment, 
task and interaction. The need to be explicit is reduced as 
the team learns the task. The second strategy seems to 
be to dynamically allocate task-relevant resources to team 
members to take care of workload distribution problems by 
giving more backup and engaging in adaptive behaviour.  
OuTCOMES
The shipmate model suggests that familiar teams ap-
proach a dynamic environment differently from unfamiliar 
teams. First, familiar teams seem to be more attentive (hi-
gher heart rate during low workload [20, 21]), more resilient 
(lower heart rate during high workload [19]), and adaptive 
(decreasing heart rate during novel situations, 2 and re-
covery [20]). A SMM of team members seems to enable 
familiar teams to act more quickly and more thoroughly 
and to achieve greater mission success (e.g. more hits).
STAFFINg, SAFETy AND TRAININg
The shipmate model has implications for the rotation 
of personnel in expert teams. Mastery of rules, procedures, 
and skills is not enough for high performance by a team. 
Personnel need to develop a SMM of the other team mem-
bers. Keeping teams intact during training and operations 
could be a way of achieving this. 
Consequently, there are implications for staffing. The 
findings indicate a policy of promoting stable team mem-
bership. When the question of replacing a team member 
arises, one solution could be to choose between potential 
candidates based on their familiarity with the team in qu-
estion. Training (e.g. a simulator) should also be conducted 
collectively as a team prior to actual performance, and not 
individually as is the case in many organisations.
It is obvious that it is almost impossible to avoid ro-
tation. Unfamiliarity will therefore always be present to 
a greater or lesser extent. But the findings can contribute 
to a higher level of safety by proposing that SCO should 
avoid putting together unfamiliar teams in situations where 
a possible novel and critical situation may occur before they 
have had time to operate together for some time. If this is 
impossible, one recommendation would be to use the first 
occasion on which they are assembled to obtain vital infor-
mation about each other and to spread it throughout the 
team. The findings indicate that a SMM of team members 
enhances a team’s sensitivity to change (ref. the propo-
sed shipmate model). A crucial issue for a newly formed 
team to attend to would therefore seem to be to increase 
and share awareness of how each team member reacts to 
a high workload and uncertainty. Second, knowing when to 
use closed loop communication will be crucial in relation 
to making sure that everybody understands and learns 
as a situation unfolds and develops. Similarly, each team 
member must understand and engage in behaviour such as 
mutual performance monitoring, backup, and adaptability. 
Following the logic of Espevik et al. [19–21] findings, a newly 
formed team will be able to learn more quickly and adapt 
better to high workload situations. 
If team members are trained to make proper plans, 
prior to and during an activity it will eventually enhance 
performance. One way is to train them to set goals, create 
an open environment, share information related to task 
requirements, and clarify each team member’s role and 
responsibilities. This will help team members to build si-
tuational awareness and SMM, thereby enabling teams to 
better coordinate their activity [15, 24]. 
Cross training refers to a strategy in which each member 
is trained on the task, duties and responsibilities of his or 
her fellow team members. The goal of this type of training 
is to provide team members with a clear understanding 
of the entire team function, and how one’s own particular 
task and responsibilities interrelate with those of the other 
team members. This will eventually create SMM that enable 
each team member to anticipate the information the other 
team members need, enhance co-ordination and reduce the 
need for communication among teams. Volpe et al. [13], 
and Cannon-Bowers and Salas [25] showed the effects of 
cross training on 3 different studies. 
In team self-correction training, teams review events, cor-
rect errors, discuss strategies and plan future events. In this 
kind of training, it is important to state the learning objectives 
and, based on these goals, correct attitudes, behaviours and 
cognitions. It also gives the team members the possibility to 
provide feedback and learn SMM of team members. Feed
-back ought to be given in a non-threatening manner, and 
include suggestions for prevention in the future [26].
CONCLuSIONS
Espevik et al. [19–21] have demonstrated that knowled-
ge about team members (i.e. a SMM of the team members) 
adds to performance (i.e. coordination and communication), 
efficiency (accuracy, latency and mission success), and 
resilience (i.e. hearth rate) over and above the contribution 
of operational skills. This confirms SMM of team members 
as an important and independent construct with an added 
value in relation to team performance and efficiency. It the-
reby expands previous knowledge, where the focus has been 
on equipment, tasks, and team interaction. The findings 
represent a contribution to and fill in a vital gap in the SMM 
literature and they have implications for training, staffing, 
and safety issues for teams in safety-critical organisations.
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